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The Impact of Ownership Structure on
Wage Intensity in Japanese Corporations
Toru Yoshikawa
School of Business, Singapore Management University, 469 Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 259756
Phillip H. Phan*
Lally School of Management and Technology,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1108th St., Troy, NY 12180-3590
Parthiban David
Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
The authors studied the effect of ownership structure on human capital investments as indicated by
wage intensity, defined as the ratio of expenditure on employee wages to sales, in a sample of 996
Japanese manufacturing firms during their economic recession of 1998-2002. They found that
domestic shareholders, with interests beyond financial considerations, enhance wage intensity,
especially when performance is low, and thereby safeguard human capital investments. Foreign
shareholders with sole interest in financial returns have an opposite effect; they reduce wage
intensity when firm performance is low.
Keywords: corporate governance; Japan; human capital theory; ownership structure; theory
of the firm
A firm’s most valuable resource is often its human capital—the knowledge, skills, and
capabilities of its people (Huselid, 1995). For sustained competitive advantage and above-
normal performance, firms should nurture human capital by making long-term investments in
building human capability and appropriately allocating resources to wages (Barney & Wright,
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 518 276-2319; fax: 518 276-8661.
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1998). Firms often provide institutional safeguards to protect investments in human capital;
for example, Japanese firms have institutionalized a practice of lifetime employment to foster
human capital investments. When economic conditions worsen, however, it becomes chal-
lenging for firms to stay committed to maintaining such institutional safeguards. Although
cutting wages and employment may be an economic necessity to improve cash flows (Cascio,
1993), it can also hurt performance by undermining employee trust, loyalty, and commitment
(Mroczkowski & Hanaoka, 1997).
Although employee human capital investments represent a crucial resource for sustained
competitive advantage, agency theory–based research continues to exclude consideration of
employee stakeholders (Blair & Roe, 1999). As residual claimants, owners play an important
role in the shaping of resource allocation decisions. When faced with economic hardship, do
owners support implicit contracts to safeguard human capital, or do they pressure managers to
cut costs? Recent research has emphasized that owners are heterogeneous and have different
preferences (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Heterogeneous owners are likely
to differ in their effects on human capital investments. We focus on wage intensity (the ratio of
expenditure on wages to firm sales) as an indicator of human capital investments. We present
and test theory to explain why some owners safeguard wages even when firms face economic
hardship, whereas other owners pressure firms to cut wages to reduce costs.
Research on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance has
yielded mixed results (cf. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). This is because the rela-
tionship is mediated by intervening variables, and is likely to be recursive and therefore caus-
ally ambiguous. Our study has the potential to partially address this issue by developing a
midrange theory examining the effects of ownership structure on human capital investments.
This approach gives us a theoretically defensible model for the relationship between corporate
governance and firm-level decisions, which we believe represents a contribution to the contin-
uing debate over whether corporate governance matters to competitive advantage.
Theory
Agency Theory
Agency theory examines the issues that arise in public corporations when their principals
(owners) delegate the task of managing to agents (managers) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In
this model, principals contract with agents to manage a firm with a view to maximizing the
wealth of the principals. However, information asymmetry and the potential for opportunism
make it difficult to ensure that agents always act in the best interests of principals. Extant
empirical studies using agency theory examine the resolution of principal-agent conflicts
through governance mechanisms, such as boards of directors, executive pay and succession,
and takeover defenses, as well as the effects of these conflicts on corporate strategy, such as
investments in R&D, capital, and diversification, and on performance (see Shleifer & Vishny
[1997] for a comprehensive review).
Some research in agency theory has also examined principal-principal conflicts. Here,
principals differ in their preferences with respect to risk and returns on investments, so that
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conflicts among them can also lead to agency problems. Although the research assumes that a
principal’s goal is to seek maximization on a security’s returns, one stream advances the
notion that principals with conflicting interests may support agents’ pursuit of self-interest if
in doing so the former achieve their own goals (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1983). The empirical
research has examined such issues as how principal conflicts shape takeover defenses
(Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988), CEO pay (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998), R&D invest-
ments (Bushee, 1998; Kochhar & David, 1995), corporate innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002;
Zahra, 1996), and firm performance (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Another stream examines
principal conflicts that arise when block shareholders use their power to expropriate wealth
from minority shareholders (Chang, 2003; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002;
Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Morck, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1988).
Although agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts, the research almost exclu-
sively focuses on the relationship between just principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling,
1976), paying scant attention to other stakeholders. Partly, this is because the focus of the cor-
porate governance question is on the residual claimants (the owners) who are most exposed to
expropriation (Jensen, 1986). Stakeholders such as employees are treated as factors of produc-
tion—wages are exogenously determined by labor markets, and the employee contract is thus
outside the purview of corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Blair & Roe, 1999).
Despite the valuable insights offered by agency theory, it has needlessly limited the scope
of corporate governance research by focusing only on principals and agents. Several research-
ers have called for extending the agency model to incorporate a broader set of stakeholders
(Hill & Jones, 1992), particularly employees (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Blair & Roe, 1999),
as a way to build more complete models. Indeed, the concept of corporate governance is con-
cerned with “the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the
corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders” (Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1999: 11), placing an emphasis on
the importance of the institutional context. Thus, we need to separate corporate governance
from agency theory and not assume that stakeholders have full protection of their claims
through explicit contracts (Morck et al., 1988).
Stakeholder-Agency Theory
If labor is a generic input, then the forces of supply and demand in external labor markets
should be a good determinant of its price (wages). However, the actual relationship between a
firm and labor is more complex. To maximize productivity, employees may need to develop
firm-specific skills (Becker, 1964). Yet employees may be reluctant to make such investments
because they are vulnerable to ex post expropriation by the firm (Williamson, 1985). For
example, employment contracts that guarantee a wage payment can solve this firm-specific
investment problem, but they work only in munificent environments where the need for
recontracting (or revaluation of the wage contract) is low. If a firm’s competitive environment
is dynamic, the costs of frequent recontracting can be prohibitive. Thus, governance safe-
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guards are necessary to prevent market failure in firm-specific investments in labor
(Williamson, 1985).
An implicit long-term employment contract is another solution to the firm-specific invest-
ment problem (Blair & Roe, 1999). For example, Japanese corporations have institutionalized
“permanent employment” wherein new university graduates are recruited with an assurance
of job security till retirement (McMillan, 1996). In such labor contracts, employees are paid
less than marginal product in the early years and more than marginal product in later years
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The high pay in later years represents a deferred compensation
for firm-specific investments made by the employee during the early years.
However, because such employees are unlikely to find greater-than-marginal product
wages outside the firm, they are exposed to expropriation risk after having made their firm-
specific human capital investments. A firm can transfer the marginal product of an employee’s
effort (the “excess” wage) to its shareholders by reneging on implied promises of job security.
This can happen when firms face economic hardship. In poor economic environments, wage
cuts and layoffs may become necessary to protect the viability of a firm. Although wage cuts
and layoffs can lower operating costs, they can also hurt employee morale, undermine the
value of irreversible investments in firm-specific human capital, and negatively affect labor
productivity. If we could objectively determine the performance implications of wage cuts and
layoffs, deciding whether to use them would be straightforward. In reality, uncertainty and
bounded rationality make this difficult to do, leading to stakeholder conflict during the course
of action.
Therefore, to understand managerial choices on wage intensity, we need to consider the
interests of a firm’s most strategic stakeholders, the owners, and the influence they are likely to
have over managerial choices. The question posed here is whether owners support or oppose
implicit long-term employment contracts. Supporting such contracts can increase operating
costs but provides institutional safeguards that can enhance managerial credibility and
employee trust, thereby facilitating firm-specific human capital investments. Opposing such
contracts attenuates employees’ incentives to make firm-specific human capital investments
but can reduce operating costs.
Ownership Structure
Ownership structure can provide the institutional mechanism needed for safeguarding
implicit contracts. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) highlighted two dimensions that help catego-
rize owners: (a) whether they pursue financial or strategic interests and (b) the degree of com-
mitment or liquidity represented by their ownership stakes. Owners emphasizing financial
interests are strictly concerned with their returns on investments. Such owners are likely to
value liquidity and typically own fewer shares so that they can easily exit their holdings. Own-
ers that emphasize strategic interests are concerned with multiple goals such as “regulating
competition between firms, underwriting relational contracts, securing markets, managing
technological dependence, and protecting managerial autonomy from outside shareholders”
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003: 451). Typically, they have other commercial interests or strategic
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relationships with the firms in which they invest. Such owners are likely to own larger stakes
and be committed to the long-term interests of the firm.
The domestic owners of Japanese firms, such as other Japanese firms and financial institu-
tions, tend to emphasize strategic interests. They support employees’ investments in human
capital by using their ownership stakes as a form of insurance against ex post recontracting
risks. Although they have an incentive to protect the current value of their investments as
stockholders, strategic imperatives force them to consider the long-term performance and sta-
bility of the network of firms in which they are a part. For example, they may assist financially
challenged firms in protecting employment contracts by muting the demand for stock returns.
They can also facilitate the restructuring of corporate capital, which is more liquid than human
capital, by actively managing and/or financing the restructuring effort of troubled firms
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996; Nakatani, 1984). Such
cross-subsidization of cash flows is a form of insurance to reduce performance variability
among the members of a network and a reinforcement of reciprocity norms (Gerlach, 1992).
Foreign owners pursue a strictly financial objective for their investments. As arm’s-length
investors, they do not benefit from any commercial transactions with investee firms. Because
they can hedge their risks through portfolio diversification, they are more likely to be con-
cerned with the immediate efficiencies achieved through wage cuts and layoffs. As a conse-
quence, foreign owners are less likely to be committed to stakeholder management principles.
Driven solely by financial gains, these investors take a relatively dispassionate attitude toward
employee wages. They are more likely to calculate the extent to which investment in human
capital affects a company’s bottom line in the short term. Accordingly, foreign owners may
oppose implicit employment contracts and pressure firms to reduce wage intensity.
Hypotheses
Wage Intensity
The research on the relationship between boards of directors and firm performance has
yielded mixed results (cf. Dalton et al., 1998). To build finer grained theory, we examine the
impact of corporate governance on specific managerial strategic decisions that may lead to
firm performance. We argued that a firm’s most valuable resource is its human capital and that
the long-term results of such investments are cumulative (Barney & Wright, 1998; Huselid,
1995). Thus, the stance taken by a firm’s dominant owners on the importance of human capital
would shape managerial decisions, especially during economic hardship, on such invest-
ments. To measure the commitment to human capital investments, we use wage intensity,
defined as the ratio of expenditure on wages to firm sales. This measure of labor costs can
include both wage cuts and layoffs.
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Main Effects
Implicit contracts such as “lifetime employment” are a means to protect firm-specific
investments in human capital. During years of prosperity, it is relatively easy to fulfill such
implicit contracts. In a difficult economic environment, it is more challenging to sustain these
implicit contracts. For example, in Japanese corporations, decades of prosperity had rein-
forced the practice of “lifetime employment,” yet the economic challenges following the crash
in the 1990s threatened to undermine such practices. We have argued that the effects of owner-
ship structure on wage intensity depend on the nature of ownership. Domestic owners, as long-
term owners with business relationships, share a norm of reciprocity and are likely to favor
higher wage intensity to safeguard long-term human capital investments. Foreign owners have
strict financial goals and are more likely to push for a reduction in wage intensity to cut costs.
Hypothesis 1: The ratio of ownership by domestic investors is positively associated with wage
intensity.
Hypothesis 2: The ratio of ownership by foreign investors is negatively associated with wage
intensity.
Moderating Effects
Although all firms face pressures on wages in a difficult economy, such pressures are par-
ticularly high for firms with poor financial performance. When firm performance is low, firms
are strapped for resources and are under pressure to cut costs. If a firm suffers poor perfor-
mance, restructuring accompanied by layoffs and wage reductions becomes more important
for protecting cash flows. As foreign owners are primarily interested in maximizing financial
returns or minimizing investment losses, they would likely interpret poor performance as a
signal for more wage cuts and layoffs to reduce costs. Domestic owners, on the other hand, are
likely to see poor performance as a signal for more employee protection. We have argued that
domestic and foreign owners have opposite effects on wage intensity, with the former enhanc-
ing wage intensity and the latter attenuating wage intensity. This tendency is likely to be even
stronger when firms encounter poor performance, implying the following moderation
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Poor firm performance strengthens the positive association between domestic owner-
ship and wage intensity.
Hypothesis 4: Poor firm performance strengthens the negative association between foreign owner-
ship and wage intensity.
There relationships are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Method
The Japanese Context
Japan provides a useful context for our study because (a) Japanese corporations have insti-
tutionalized a practice of lifetime employment to demonstrate their commitment to human
capital, and (b) the economic recession during the 1990s has placed significant pressure on the
ability to preserve the institution of lifetime employment. In the years following World War II,
the Japanese economy expanded at double-digit rates, allowing firms to accumulate enough
financial slack to satisfy the claims of employees and shareholders. During this period, many
Japanese firms institutionalized a practice known as lifetime employment wherein new uni-
versity graduates are recruited with assurances of job and wage security until retirement
(McMillan, 1996). Although they do not guarantee lifetime employment (firms retain the
right to fire employees), an implicit social contract exists. After the economic bubble burst, the
Japanese economy grew at an average annual rate of 1.7% between 1992 and 1997 and saw
further declines to 0.2% between 1998 and 2002 (Economic and Social Research Institute,
2002). This eliminated financial slack, which increased the pressure for economic efficiency
on managers and shareholders. Although there is now a question as to whether the lifetime
employment system still exists (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001), anecdotal evidence suggests
that many firms are still trying to maintain it.
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Figure 1
Research Model Showing Relationships Among Variables
According to a 1999 survey of 1,204 Japanese firms, 68% claimed to still have a lifetime
employment system (Suzuki, 2001). Yoshimori (1995: 34), quoting the chairman of Toshiba,
said that discharging employees “is the most serious sin” and further quoting the chairman of
Chichibu, stated that job security is the “responsibility of the corporation.” In his speech at the
2003 Japan Corporate Governance Forum, Mr. Idei, CEO of Sony, stated that
we . . . cannot use employee layoffs. Therefore, although we are trying to improve our productivity
quickly . . . we have the life-time employment system in Japan and that is reducing labor mobility.
Thus, there is a gap between our need to win global competition and various practices in the post-
war system that have contributed to social stability. (Japan Corporate Governance Forum, 2004: 3)
In sum, large Japanese corporations still encounter social constraints in using layoffs or wage
reductions to combat performance declines. Organizational inertia is likely to slow the
deinstitutionalization process of such practices (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993).
The Sample
This consisted of a pooled cross-sectional time series of data on 996 publicly traded Japa-
nese manufacturing firms collected from the Nikkei NEEDS database during the period 1998-
2002. This database covers 1,184 to 1,400 manufacturing firms (the actual number varies
yearly) listed in the first and second sections of the domestic stock exchanges. Our sample
firms include those listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and four other domestic
exchanges.
The firms are divided into first-section and second-section listings, comparable to the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation (system) (NASDAQ), respectively. Firms in the first section listings include “blue-
chip” firms and those with long operating histories and proven cash flows. As of March 2002,
there are 1,562 firms in the first section. Second-section listings, of which there are 928, repre-
sent smaller and relatively younger firms. Our sample consists of 658 or 42% of the total firms
in the first section and 338 or 36% of the total firms in the second section. The ratio of repre-
sentation is not statistically different between the two groups.
We could not obtain consistent data for all the firms for the entire duration of the study
period because some firms changed their fiscal year-ends, declared bankruptcy, or were
delisted because of merger or acquisition. After dropping firms for which consistent data were
unavailable, we had a total of 4,980 firm-years, representing 996 manufacturing firms over 5
years (1998-2002).
To limit heterogeneity effects arising from widely different employment practices and
accounting conventions across manufacturing and service industries, we restricted our sample
to manufacturing firms. The sample was categorized into 16 industries, via the classification
provided in the Nikkei database. They included food, textiles, pulp and paper, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, petroleum, rubber, ceramics, steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, electric,
shipbuilding, and transportation. In all, the total sales of our sample firms represent 29% of
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Japan’s gross domestic product in 2002 and represents 40% of all listed firms in the first and
second sections of the Japanese stock exchanges.
Dependent Variable
We measured wage intensity as the ratio of expenditure on wages to firm sales. Wages are
defined as executive and employee salaries, bonuses, and other benefits such as pension con-
tributions provided by the company. Because the use of stock options is still uncommon in
Japan, salary captures most of the wages paid in this category. Payments to executive directors
consist of base salary and director fees (if they serve on the board), so part of executive com-
pensation is counted as a wage payment to employees according to Japanese tax law.
Recall that our research focuses on the effects of ownership structure on resource allocation
to employee wages. Managers can reduce resource allocations to wages by reducing the wages
of each employee, reducing the number of employees, or both. Prior research has used various
alternate measures, such as average wages per employee (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 1999),
total number of employees (Brown & Medhoff, 1988), and total wages as a ratio of firm sales
(Scheps, 1981). In layoff studies, dummy variables representing large reductions in number of
employees have also been used as a measure of labor intensity (Ahmadjian & Robinson,
2001). In the absence of specific information on the type of employee laid off, effects on wage
allocation are ambiguous. If layoffs involve reduction in low-wage employees, average wages
per employee will rise; conversely, a reduction in high-wage employees will result in a
decrease of average wage per employee.
Taking previous measures and their limitations into consideration, we chose to measure
wage intensity as the proportion of total wages to sales for our dependent variable. This mea-
sure of resource allocation to wages is analogous to measures of resource allocation in similar
long-term investments such as R&D; R&D intensity has long been measured as the ratio of
R&D expenditures to firm sales (David et al., 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002). Our wage inten-
sity measure is comprehensive as it captures the net amount of resources allocated to wages
after reductions in head count (through hiring freezes, early retirement, and layoffs) and in
total wages (through reduced overtime or employee transfers to lower paying subsidiaries)
(Mroczkowski & Hanaoka, 1997).
Independent Variables
The independent variables of this study were domestic and foreign ownership. Domestic
ownership was the proportion of total shares held by Japanese corporations and financial insti-
tutions (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). Foreign ownership was the proportion of total shares
held by foreign owners (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001). These measures have been used reli-
ably in past studies (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln et al., 1996). Owner-
ship data were obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS database.
Domestic owners are other Japanese corporations and financial institutions that own shares
for the long term. Ownership is typically a means for bolstering business and other ties
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(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), and thus corporate owners may include suppliers and custom-
ers. Financial owners include bank lenders and insurance companies that underwrite insur-
ance policies for their investee firms. Japanese companies are often organized in business
groups termed keiretsu, and domestic owners use shares to cement business group relation-
ships even when direct commercial ties are absent. Domestic owners own large stakes, often
held reciprocally, and over the long term and are rarely sold. Although a small portion of their
shares may be used for trading, the bulk of the shares are held for the long term (Gerlach,
1992).
According to the Bank of Japan (2001), most foreign owners tend to be institutional inves-
tors from the United States and the United Kingdom, accounting for 40% and 30% of total for-
eign shareholdings, respectively. Unlike domestic owners who own higher stakes and trade
their shares infrequently if at all, foreign investors own relatively small stakes and trade their
shares frequently (Charkham, 1994). For example, more than 45% of the stock traded in the
first section on the TSE was done by foreign institutions in 1998, up from 10% in 1988
(Kikuchi, 1999). As most of the shares held by domestic owners are not actively traded, active
trading of stocks by foreign owners can significantly affect the stock price of a firm.
Moderator Variable
Performance was measured as the ratio of net income to total assets, or return on assets
(ROA). We followed prior research on Japanese corporations in choosing to use an accounting
rather than a market measure of performance (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). Previous studies
have found ROA to be a stable and reliable measure of Japanese firm performance (e.g.,
Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, &
Hashimoto, 2005).
Control Variables
We included debt, size, and industry controls to account for other factors that might affect
wage intensity. Debt financing reduces available free cash by imposing regular interest pay-
ments, thereby pressuring a firm to cut back on discretionary expenses (Jensen, 1986) such as
wages. We measured debt as the ratio of debt to total assets. Size was the log of firm sales.
Larger firms are traditionally more likely to maintain prevailing employment practices,
although by the mid-1990s, large Japanese firms began to feel increasingly pressured to cut
back on employees (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001). Our control variable for industry was the
mean value of wage intensity for all the firms in the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) code as a focal firm, as reported by the NEEDS database. Mean industry values
of the dependent variable are considered superior to coarser grained controls such as industry
dummy variables because they deal specifically with the systematic variance of the dependent
variable caused by unobserved fixed effects (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990).
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Data Analysis
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables, and Table 2 presents
the results of the panel data analysis. We used panel data, with observations on a set of firms
made repeatedly during a period of time, and controlled for lagged values of the dependent
variable, wage intensity, as well as for lagged values of other explanatory variables, to obtain
consistent estimates of the parameters. White’s test of heteroscedasticity and the Arellano-
Bond test of first-order autocorrelation indicate that the models are heteroscedastic and
autocorrelated (Arellano, 2003). We therefore employed the Arellano-Bond procedure, which
is designed for analyzing autoregressive-distributed lag models from panels with many cross-
sectional units observed for relatively few time periods via general method of moments
(GMM) estimates (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Using GMM provides improved estimates in the presence of the unknown
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation that often arise in dynamic panels (Arellano, 2003). In
addition, panel data analysis accounts for firm-specific heterogeneity that is constant over
time, arising, for example, from differences in firm-specific employment practices. Unob-
served firm-specific heterogeneity is eliminated by first-differencing or subtracting the lagged
values of the regressors. Second, endogeneity issues that arise when explanatory variables are
correlated with an error term are easily addressed with panel data. Endogeneity could arise in
two ways in our model. If the dependent variable were a function of the error term, and the
lagged dependent variable were in turn a function of the dependent variable, the lagged
dependent variable would be correlated with the error term. Ownership stakes, which repre-
sent a discretionary choice made by both domestic and foreign owners, are determined in part
by a firm’s prior performance and other unobservable factors, such as the firm’s idiosyncratic
employment policies, and are therefore potentially correlated with the error term. Prior
research has emphasized the importance of modeling endogeneity by using instrumental vari-
ables for ownership structure to control for possible reverse causality (Chang, 2003). To do so,
we used lagged values of the regressors as instruments of the first-differenced regressors.
These instruments were chosen because they were correlated with the first-differenced
regressors but not with the error term.
We centered the values of the explanatory variables by subtracting the means to reduce
potential multicollinearity in our tests of the interaction effects (Aiken & West, 1991). We
examined variance inflation factors (VIFs) to check for multicollinearity and found the values
to be less than 2, well below the cutoff value of 10 that indicates excessive multicollinearity
(Greene, 2003). Model 4 of Table 2 reports the full results of the dynamic panel data estima-
tion using the GMM procedure.
The GMM residuals are computed with the actual values of the endogenous variables.
Thus, the residuals are computed across a different set of regressors than those used to esti-
mate the model, which would lead to inconsistencies in reporting R-squared values (Sribney,
Wiggins, & Drukker, 2003). Accordingly, in the Arellano-Bond procedure, R-squared values
are not reported. We therefore present another set of results (Models 5 to 8 in Table 2), based
on generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects regression, in order to report the changes
in variance explained for a series of hierarchical models (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). GLS models
account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation but not for firm heterogeneity and
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endogeneity and do not control for the impact of lagged dependent variables. However, it
allows us to assess the size of the effects and the significance of the size. We found that the
GLS model coefficients were very similar to those derived with the GMM model and so were
confident that our results were robust to the choice of the model.
Results
We note that the hierarchical GLS models essentially provided results very similar to the
more appropriate GMM procedure (compare Model 4 and Model 8). The coefficient for for-
eign ownership has a negative sign in the GMM estimates and a positive sign in the GLS
estimates, but the coefficient is not statistically significant in either model. The changes in
R-squared were statistically significant in each step. Hypothesis 1, which states that domestic
owners enhance wage intensity, is supported by the significant, positive coefficient for domes-
tic ownership. Hypothesis 2, which states that foreign ownership reduces wage intensity, is not
supported, as the statistically insignificant coefficient for foreign ownership indicates.
The interaction effects of both foreign and domestic ownership with firm performance are
statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. We therefore infer support for Hypothe-
ses 3 and 4, which state that domestic owners enhance wage intensity as performance declines,
and foreign owners reduce wage intensity as performance declines. To facilitate interpretation
of the interaction effects, we present plots of the relationship between ownership and wage
intensity in Figures 2 and 3 (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). For the entire range
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The Relationship Between Wage Intensity and Domestic Ownership
Given Firm Performance
of possible ownership values, we plotted wage intensity at mean levels of the other explana-
tory variables and performance levels set at low (mean minus one standard deviation),
medium (mean), and high (mean plus one standard deviation) values. The plots visually con-
firm that wage intensity increases as domestic ownership increases (Hypothesis 1) and that the
slope is higher at lower levels of firm performance (Hypothesis 3). The plot for foreign owner-
ship indicates a negative slope, but the magnitude is not significantly different from zero (thus
failing to support Hypothesis 2). However, the pattern indicates support for an interaction
effect (Hypothesis 4) such that at high levels of foreign ownership, wage intensity for low-
performance firms is lower than for high-performance firms. At low levels of foreign
ownership, low-performance firms have higher wage intensity than high-performance firms.
We note that the changes in R-squared, although statistically significant, were of low mag-
nitude. This is consistent with the literature as the values we obtain are very similar to those
reported in similar research examining effects of ownership structure on firm performance in
Japanese corporations. Specifically, our R-squared changes of 1.19, 8.03, and 0.53 are very
similar to values of 1% and 0.2% reported by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) and Lincoln et al.
(1996). There may be two reasons for the relatively low magnitudes of R-squared changes.
First, R-squared statistics are based on GLS models, and these may be misestimated in
dynamic panel data analysis involving lagged dependent variables. Another reason may be
that ownership, although statistically significant, may not inherently explain much variance
because wage decisions are complex and also depend on a number of other factors. Thus, we
feel that the R-squared values should be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive evidence
and be interpreted cautiously. A closer examination of the fully standardized coefficients (beta
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The Relationship Between Wage Intensity and
Foreign Ownership Given Firm Performance
coefficient multiplied by the variance of the independent variable divided by the variance of
the dependent variable) indicates that wage intensity increases by 0.28 standard deviations for
every 1 standard deviation increase in domestic ownership. That is, a 1 standard deviation
increase in domestic ownership increases wage intensity by 12%, suggesting that domestic
owners do have a meaningful impact.
We report one additional model (Model 9) in order to test the robustness of our model to
alternate measures of moderator and control variables. Firm size can be measured using alter-
nate measures such as size, assets, and employees (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel,
1996). Furthermore, firm performance can be measured as absolute ROA or ROA adjusted for
industry. Because many of the firms are diversified, adjustment for industry ROA can provide
a better measure of relative performance. Ideally, ROA should be adjusted for weighted indus-
try performance (the multiple of the ratio of sales in each industry to industry ROA) (Stimpert
& Duhaime, 1997). We do not have access to industry segment data, and we therefore adjusted
for mean industry ROA based on reported two-digit SIC codes (similar to Hitt et al., 1996).
Results using log of total assets as a measure of firm size and adjusted ROA (difference
between firm and industry ROA) are reported in Model 9. The results are substantially very
similar to our other models and provide additional evidence of the robustness of our findings
to alternate measures.
To test the robustness of our model to the specification of the dependent variable, we pres-
ent additional analysis in Table 3 using alternate operationalizations of the dependent variable.
We follow prior research in reporting results for wages per employee (Bertrand &
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Table 3
Results of Panel Data Analysis of Wages/Employee,
Number of Employees, and Downsizinga
Hypothesis Wages/Employee Employees Downsizing
(Sign) GMM GMM Probit
Wages per employee—lagged 0.18***
Employees—lagged 1.02***
Wages per employee—industry 0.49***
Employees—industry 0.07
Downsizing—industry 0.49***
Size 0.72*** 0.42*** –0.03
Debt 1.15*** 0.32* 0.45***
Domestic ownership Hypothesis 1 (+) 2.96* 2.29** –0.64***
Foreign ownership Hypothesis 2 (–) –4.68* –3.00*** –0.10
Return on assets (ROA) 4.67*** –1.32 –7.24***
Domestic Ownership × ROA Hypothesis 3 (–) 1.06 –1.92 –10.05*
Foreign Ownership × ROA Hypothesis 4 (+) –7.11 –0.09 9.27
Model Wald χ2 248.20*** 3,478.46*** 336.72***
Note: GMM = general method of moments.
a. N = 4,980 (panel data on 996 firms × 5 years).
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Mullainathan, 1999), number of employees (Brown & Medhoff, 1988), and layoffs measured
as a decrease in number of employees in excess of 5% between previous and current year
(Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001). Out of a total of 4,980 firm-years, 1,794 (36%) had employee
reductions in excess of 5%, 1,786 (36%) had employee reductions in excess of 0% but less
than 5%, 57 (1%) had no change, and 1,343 (27%) had an increase in number of employees.
Overall, these numbers indicate a downward trend in employment that is consistent with
Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001).
The results across all three measures are consistent with Hypothesis 1; domestic ownership
is positively associated with wages per employee and number of employees, and negatively
with downsizing, indicating that domestic owners support human capital investments. We also
find some support for Hypothesis 2; foreign ownership is negatively associated with wages
per employee and number of employees, but, in contrast to Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001)
who reported a positive effect, we find no effect on downsizing. We did not find significant
interaction effects. The only significant interaction effect, domestic ownership with perfor-
mance, has a negative effect on downsizing. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, this indicates that
domestic owners are more likely to reduce pressures for downsizing when performance is
high than when performance is low. These mixed findings indicate that more research is prob-
ably needed on the type of employee laid off. If layoffs involve reduction in low-wage employ-
ees, average wages per employee will rise; conversely, a reduction in high-wage employees
will result in a decrease of average wage per employee.
Summary of Results
In sum, we found that domestic investors supported investments in human capital. Further-
more, this positive effect was stronger when performance was low. Foreign ownership had the
opposite effect on human capital investments. Foreign ownership reduced wage intensity, but
this relationship was observed only when performance was low; foreign ownership was not
associated with wage intensity when performance was high.
We interpret the strongest of these results to mean that the effect of domestic owners is con-
sistent with their role as an institutional safeguard to facilitate asset-specific human capital
investments. Their long-term ownership and infrequent sales of shares serve to attenuate
short-term capital market pressures and the threat of takeovers, thereby making it easier for
managers to support implicit long-term contracts that protect employee interests (Lee &
O’Neill, 2003). Our empirical results lend support to Aguilera and Jackson’s statement that
“the strategic interests and long-term commitment of capital support managerial alignment
with employees and facilitate investments in firm-specific skills and stable employment”
(2003: 460).
Our results show that foreign owners sought to reduce wage intensity only when perfor-
mance was low, as indicated by the positive coefficient for the interaction of performance with
foreign ownership. This can be interpreted to mean that foreign investors likely view wages as
discretionary expenditure that can be adjusted downward if necessary to cut costs. They are
thus likely to pressure poorly performing firms to demonstrate a commitment to cost cutting.
This result is congruent with the agency view that owners strictly concerned with financial
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returns are willing to oppose implicit long-term contracts if they appear to conflict with profit
maximization goals.
Discussion
Research Implications
Our results reinforce the need to integrate stakeholder theory and transaction cost theory to
agency theory to develop a richer understanding of corporate governance. Agency theory is
based on the assumption of profit-maximizing principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), yet
principals may have divergent preferences and ideas on how to maximize those preferences.
Transaction cost theory suggests that governance mechanisms are needed to safeguard
employees’ firm-specific human capital investments from ex post expropriation (Williamson,
1985). Combined with stakeholder theory, which highlights the importance of considering the
interests not just of shareholders but also of other stakeholders (Freeman, 1984), we believe
that this more general framework affords us a more comprehensive approach of modeling the
complex relationships between different groups of principals, management, and other
stakeholders.
Integrating stakeholder theory helps us extend prior findings in agency theory. Prior
research has shown evidence of profit redistribution from shareholders to managers as manag-
ers may use their power to expropriate wealth, for example, through excessive pay (Hambrick
& Finkelstein, 1995). Similarly, profit redistribution may occur from minority to majority
shareholders, as powerful majority shareholders may use their power to expropriate wealth
(Chang, 2003; Claessens et al., 2002). Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) demonstrated profit
redistribution effects when owners transfer profits from more profitable to less profitable
firms in their portfolio. Similarly, our findings may be interpreted as a form of profit redistri-
bution from shareholders to employees and vice versa. Thus, although agency theory limits
itself to relationships between owners and shareholders, integrating stakeholder theory per-
mits us to extend governance research to provide insights about a broader set of stakeholders.
Directions for Future Research
Although Japanese firms have struggled to cope with the 1990s’ economic downturn by
reducing wage intensity (Mroczkowski & Hanaoka, 1997), our results suggest that the pres-
ence of domestic ownership mitigated some of the pressure. Nevertheless, the influence of
domestic owners was not enough to completely negate the need for cost cutting, which was
exacerbated by the presence of foreign owners. The practice of lifetime employment has come
under threat during this time (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001), and more research is needed to
determine if Japanese corporations can continue to use such implicit contracts.
The operationalization of our wage intensity construct does not separate the wages paid to
executives and employees, which exposes our results to the interpretation that when domestic
owners are de facto committed to maintaining wage intensity, top management may exploit
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this fact to protect their own wages by disproportionately reducing employee expenses.
Although future studies can unpack the wage measure to ensure that such explanations are
ruled out, the study’s specific context suggests that this interpretation may not hold. Japanese
executives are promoted from within so they tend to be sympathetic to the interests of employ-
ees. A Japanese CEO’s wage is on average 20 times lower than that of a comparable U.S. firm
and only 10 times, compared to 350 times for a U.S. firm, the average employee’s wage
(Wahlgren, 2001). Thus, ceteris paribus, executive wages account for a smaller share of total
labor costs than in a comparable U.S. firm.
We have noted that the impact of dominant owners on wage intensity is small. Because
wages represent one of the largest cost components, we feel that there should be more of an
impact on the human capital policy of the firm. In poor economic environments, firms are con-
stantly looking for ways to improve operational efficiency, and trimming discretionary
expenses on employment is one. The relationship is likely to be complex, being mediated by,
for example, technological intensity, life-cycle stage, or other human capital investments such
as training. Thus, future research should aim to build more comprehensive models linking
ownership structure and wage intensity by including strategy and structure constructs.
More research is needed on the processes used by various shareholder groups to influence
decisions in the boardroom. Ultimately, managers, not shareholders, make decisions on strate-
gic investments, which boards of directors ratify. Therefore, an important future research
question concerns the role of boards, their structure, and their internal processes in relation to
shareholders’ preferences. Our research suggests that the influence mechanisms of domestic
and foreign shareholders are likely to be different. The large and long-term holdings of domes-
tic owners provide them direct access to the boardroom. Foreign investors with smaller owner-
ship shares and shorter holding periods are less likely to enjoy the same direct channels of
influence. Instead, their ability to vote with their feet by selling stock, combined with the
power of moral suasion, confers indirect and perhaps substantial influence over the board-
room. Such influence may increase over time as foreign investors provide an increasing
amount of liquidity, and thus lower cost of capital, to a market’s equity stock.
Although we examined manufacturing companies in Japanese corporations, we believe
that our findings are generalizable. First, human capital is at least as important in service firms
as in manufacturing firms because the creation of economic wealth depends on management’s
ability to induce employees to make firm-specific asset investments (Blair & Roe, 1999). Sec-
ond, foreign owners of Japanese corporations are likely to be U.S.-based institutional inves-
tors who focus on financial interests. Third, as with Japanese domestic owners, founding fami-
lies in the United States such as Ford, Disney, Hewlett, Packard, or Busch are likely to view
their ownership stakes as more than a financial interest (Carlock & Florent-Treacy, 2002;
Lowenstein, 2004; Orwall & Lubin, 2004). Thus, similar ownership relationships are likely to
be observed across national contexts.
However, this does not mean that context is unimportant. Appropriate mechanisms, which
depend on the laws and social practices embedded in a national context (Aguilera & Jackson,
2003), are needed to safeguard long-term, irreversible, firm-specific investments in human
capital. In U.S. corporations, efficient external labor markets may obviate the need for implicit
guarantees of lifetime employment. Instead, firms use contingent pay, stock options, and
employee ownership to motivate firm-specific investments in human capital. In German cor-
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porations, the principle of codetermination explicitly safeguards employee investment in
human capital by providing employees with representation on the supervisory board. Thus,
we believe that a fruitful direction for future research lies in understanding how diverse institu-
tional environments can affect the ability of corporate governance systems to mediate the
claims of stakeholders and protect the firm’s value-creating potential.
Managerial Implications
Ultimately, managers make resource allocation decisions by balancing multiple pressures.
Capital markets may pressure poorly performing firms to reduce employee head count and/or
reduce wages to improve immediate cash flows. However, cutting employee wages during a
period of poor firm performance may discourage employees from making future firm-specific
investments and potentially hurt long-term competitiveness. In addition to human capital,
pressures to cut costs may affect other strategic investments such as intellectual capital and
physical capital. Our results suggest that investors with long-term interests tend to protect
employee wages, whereas those with more short-term interests favor wage cuts and layoffs
during performance declines. Navigating these opposing pressures from diverse owners is
challenging, and managers must be cognizant of the preferences of their most influential
shareholders. More research is needed to understand how managers can balance conflicting
demands from shareholders and ultimate effects on firm performance.
Our study demonstrates that absent patient investors, firms that perform poorly are likely to
find it difficult to justify high wages and thus face greater pressures to cut cost by reducing
wage intensity. This result is congruent with the agency theory view of the atomistic value-
maximizing investor who is willing to rewrite implicit long-term contracts if they appear to
conflict with profit maximization goals. In addition, our study extends agency theory research
by showing that governance mechanisms are needed not just to shape the relationships
between principals and agents but also to provide an institutional safeguard for key stake-
holders that have an eventual impact on the future value of a firm through the choices they
make today.
Principals with strict profit maximization concerns appear to use a principal-agent calcu-
lus, wherein individual profit maximization is the main objective, and stakeholders are treated
as constraints on the maximization of this objective. Principals with broader agendas such as
the coordination of strategic actions may view profit maximization from the perspective of a
collective system or group of firms and owners (Lincoln et al., 1996). Therefore, their deci-
sions to protect employee interests are entirely rational and consistent with that perspective. In
sum, principals committed to long-term ownership can provide safeguards for implicit con-
tracts to facilitate valuable long-term, firm-specific investments in human capital.
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